Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics

 CDAM Research Report, LSE-CDAM-2007-09

April 2007


Successive Information Revelation in 3-Player Infinitely Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side

Julian Merschen

In this work we focus on 3-player infinitely repeated games with incomplete information on one side. Renault (2001) has shown by counterexample that if in this setup there are more than 2 states of nature existence of completely revealing and joint plan equilibrium (JPE) for both informed players is not guaranteed. By defining a more general equilibrium concept, which relies on successive information revelation by the informed players, we were able to prove the existence of successive joint plan equilibria (SJPE) in the example from Renault (2001). Furthermore we were able to show that the set of possible SJPE is strictly larger than the set of "standard" JPE.

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