Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics
	CDAM Research Report, LSE-CDAM-2006-04 March 2006

Extensive Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity

Bernhard von Stengel and Francoise Forges

Revised September 20, 2007

This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Unless P = NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.

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