Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics

 CDAM Research Report, LSE-CDAM-2006-04

March 2006

Extensive Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity

Bernhard von Stengel and Francoise Forges

Revised September 20, 2007

This paper defines the extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) for extensive games with perfect recall. The EFCE concept extends Aumann's strategic-form correlated equilibrium (CE). Before the game starts, a correlation device generates a move for each information set. This move is recommended to the player only when the player reaches the information set. In two-player perfect-recall extensive games without chance moves, the set of EFCE can be described by polynomial number of consistency and incentive constraints. Unless P = NP, this is not possible for the set of CE, or if the game has chance moves.

A PDF file (183 kB) with the full contents of this report can be downloaded by clicking here.

Alternatively, if you would like to get a free hard copy of this report, please send the number of this report, LSE-CDAM-2006-04, together with your name and postal address to:
CDAM Research Reports Series
Centre for Discrete and Applicable Mathematics
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, U.K.
Phone: +44(0)-20-7955 7494.
Fax: +44(0)-20-7955 6877.
Email: info@maths.lse.ac.uk 

Introduction to the CDAM Research Report Series.
CDAM Homepage.

Copyright © London School of Economics & Political Science 2006